Kaliningrad and Baltic security by Collins, Arthur
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-06
Kaliningrad and Baltic security
Collins, Arthur
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2695




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.









 Thesis Advisor:                                 Mikhail Tsypkin 
 Co-Advisor:                                       Rodney Kennedy-Minott 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved            OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing 
the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2.   REPORT DATE   
June 2001 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES  COVERED 
Masters Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Kaliningrad and Baltic Security 
6.   AUTHOR(S):   Collins III, Arthur 
5.  FUNDING NUMBERS 
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8.  PERFORMING  ORGANIZATION 
     REPORT NUMBER     
9.  SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a.  DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13.   ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Russias Kaliningrad Oblast (Region) has a history of being terra incognita.  In defiance 
of geographic and historical realities, the Allied leaders of World War II carved the oblast from the northern third of East Prussia 
and awarded it to Stalins Soviet Union.  As the Soviet empire disintegrated around it, Kaliningrad became lost in the shuffle of a 
new world order.  Its very existence as a Russian exclave within an increasingly interdependent Europe brings the Oblast to the 
forefront of the Baltic regions future.  Kaliningrad plays an important part in the wider pan-European context of regional security 
and regional stability.  Using a traditional state-centric paradigm of definitive interstate borders makes the Kaliningrad riddle 
impossible to solve.  By shifting the paradigm toward regional development and regional cooperation to address common 









15.  NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
 
14.  SUBJECT TERMS   
International Relations, European Security, Security Dilemma, Regional Security, Baltic Sea Region, 
Kaliningrad, Russia. 
16.  PRICE CODE 




18.  SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500                                                                                                                                                            Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
KALININGRAD AND BALTIC SECURITY 
 
Arthur Collins III 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., Marquette University, 1987 
M.S., Troy State University, 1992 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 












Arthur Collins III 
 
 
Approved by: ___________________________________________ 









James Wirtz, Chairman 



























Russias Kaliningrad Oblast (Region) has a history of being terra incognita.  In 
defiance of geographic and historical realities, the Allied leaders of World War II carved 
the oblast from the northern third of East Prussia and awarded it to Stalins Soviet Union.  
As the Soviet empire disintegrated around it, Kaliningrad became lost in the shuffle of a 
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Russias Kaliningrad Oblast (Region) has a history of being terra incognita.  In 
defiance of geographic and historical realities, the Allied leaders of World War II carved 
the oblast from the northern third of East Prussia and awarded it to Stalins Soviet Union 
as a war trophy.  During the cold war, the west ignored Kaliningrad and focused instead 
on the strategic posture of the USSR in the Baltic.  As the Soviet empire disintegrated 
around it, Kaliningrad became lost in the shuffle of a new world order.  Today, however, 
Kaliningrads time has come.  Its very existence as a Russian exclave within an 
increasingly interdependent Europe brings the Oblast to the forefront of the Baltics 
future.  Kaliningrad plays an important part in the wider pan-European context of 
regional security and regional stability.  Recognizing this potential threat and following 
the Finnish lead, Sweden made Kaliningrad a priority of its European Union (EU) 
Presidency. 
Using a traditional state-centric paradigm of definitive interstate borders makes 
the Kaliningrad riddle impossible to solve.  By shifting the paradigm toward regional 
development and regional cooperation to address common problems, the future security 
relationship of the Baltic littoral becomes more optimistic. 
Security in general, and Baltic security in particular, encompass much more than 
military power.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is clearly the military 
force in place that guarantees a secure state structure throughout Europe.  The focus on 
hard security diminished as the cold war ended and World War III no longer seemed to 
be inevitable.  Instead, fears of stagnation and destabilization brought about by soft 
 xiv
security threats such as economic recession, environmental contamination, and health 
deterioration replaced fears of invasion or nuclear war. 
Kaliningrad is a microcosm of the greater Europe-Russia security relationship.  
The tiny exclave has all the components that cause the greatest consternation among 
officials on both sides of the continent.  Hard security and NATO expansion directly 
affects Kaliningrad and, therefore, Russia.  Kaliningrad is a hotbed of corruption, crime, 
waste, and disease:  all the soft security threats that feed the fears of western states.  A 
successful program of engagement in Kaliningrad may produce a formula for defining a 
new relationship with Russia as a whole. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.  THESIS 
This thesis addresses a small but important aspect of post-Soviet central Europe.  
It contends that current statist thinking about the problems posed by the existence of a 
Russian Oblast in the middle of an increasingly interdependent Europe will inadvertently 
lead to Kaliningrads isolation and destabilization.  Should Kaliningrad reach such a level 
of decay, it will create several security threats.  Socio-economic degradation will create 
tensions throughout the Baltic littoral that will stifle development and potentially lead to 
armed conflict.  Four sets of questions will frame the argument:   
• How did the geopolitical anomaly of Kaliningrad come to be?  What were the 
assumptions, decisions, and considerations that formed the Russian exclave? 
 
• What are the major sources of tension and debate surrounding Kaliningrad and 
what are the positions of involved and interested states? 
 
• How are the policies of NATO, the European Union, and the Russian Federation 
setting the conditions for Kaliningrads future?  
 
• How will Kaliningrad affect the overall regional security and regional economic 
regimes currently under construction in the Baltic littoral? 
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
Russias Kaliningrad Oblast (Region) has a history of being terra incognita.1  In 
defiance of geographic and historical realities, the Allied leaders of World War II carved 
the oblast from the northern third of East Prussia and awarded it to Stalins Soviet Union 
as a war trophy.  During the cold war, the west ignored Kaliningrad and focused on the 
                                                 
1 Pertti Jeonniemi et al., The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region within the 
European Union, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers, June 2000, 23; 
available from https://wwwc.cc. columbia.edu /sec/dlc/ciao/wps/jop06/jop06.html. 
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strategic posture of the USSR in the entire Baltic region.  As the Soviet empire 
disintegrated, Kaliningrad became lost in the shuffle of a new world order.  Today, 
however, Kaliningrads time has come.  Its very existence as a Russian exclave within an 
increasingly interdependent Europe brings the Oblast to the forefront of the Baltic 
regions future.  Kaliningrad plays an important part in the wider pan-European context 
of regional security and regional stability.  Recognizing this potential threat and 
following the Finnish lead, Sweden made Kaliningrad a priority of its European Union 
(EU) Presidency.  
 
Figure 1.  Kaliningrad2 
 
                                                 
2 Available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/ref.html. 
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Using a traditional state-centric paradigm of definitive interstate borders makes 
the Kaliningrad riddle impossible to solve.  By shifting the paradigm toward regional 
development and regional cooperation to address common problems, the future security 
relationship of the Baltic littoral becomes more optimistic. 
Security in general, and Baltic security in particular, encompass much more than 
military power.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is clearly the military 
force in place that guarantees a secure state structure throughout Europe.  The focus on 
hard security diminished as the cold war ended and World War III no longer seemed 
inevitable.  Instead, fears of stagnation and destabilization brought about by soft security 
threats such as economic recession, environmental contamination, and health 
deterioration replaced fears of invasion or nuclear war. 
Kaliningrad is a microcosm of the greater Europe-Russia security relationship.  
The tiny exclave has all the components that cause the greatest consternation among 
officials on both sides of the continent.  Hard security and NATO expansion directly 
impacts Kaliningrad and, therefore, Russia.  Kaliningrad is a hotbed of corruption, crime, 
waste, and disease:  all the soft security threats that feed the fears of western states.  A 
successful program of engagement in Kaliningrad may produce a formula for defining a 
new relationship with Russia as a whole.  
C.  FROM KÖNIGSBERG TO KALININGRAD 
1.  World War I 
Modern Kaliningrad is the result of three diplomatic interactions.  The first two 
involve decisions reached at the end of the two world wars; the third encompasses the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  A poor understanding of the Soviet system following 
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World War II by American and British leaders created todays Kaliningrad dilemma.  
Subsequent sovietization of Kaliningrad coupled with political decisions made during 
the 1989-1991 Soviet breakup guaranteed Kaliningrads place as a geopolitical anomaly 
that will continue to create problems throughout the entire Baltic littoral. 
From the German perspective, their occupation of the northeast Baltic during 
World War I was essentially an extension of the Königsberg region of East Prussia.  The 
German army launched ambitious cultural programs to manipulate the many different 
nationalities under their rule to turn them into passive client ethnicities dependent on 
the Germans for their development.3  As the tide of the war turned against them, 
however, they began to warm to the idea of independence for Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia.  German officials believed that they could gain an upper hand at the Brest-
Litovsk negotiations with the new Russian Bolsheviks by exploiting the interest in the 
Wilsonian self-determination that was sweeping Eastern Europe.  Support for 
independent Baltic nations also would stem Polish expansionism.  Poland sought to 
reclaim the boundaries of the old Rzeczpospolita to which Lithuania once belonged.4 
While Poland was unsuccessful in absorbing Lithuania, the Poles did annex the 
Vilnius region in October 1920.  In response, armed Lithuanians took the Memel 
(Klaipeda) region from French administrators who were supervising the cordon sanitaire 
that was to maintain a buffer between Western Europe and the radical Bolsheviks.  
Ultimately, the Versailles ambassadors dictated a tit for tat solution and established 
                                                 
3 Vejas Liulevicius, Is Kaliningrad Really Lithuania Minor? Working Papers in 
International Studies, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, January 1995, 6. 
4 V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: The Rebel Nation (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997), 24. 
 5
borders ceding Vilnius to Poland and Memel to newly independent Lithuania.  One part 
of Kaliningrads formation was complete: the Versailles boundaries of 1923 would 
reappear 67 years later. 
2.  World War II 
The next stage of Königsbergs transformation into Kaliningrad takes place 
during the Second World War.  Acting on provisions of the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop 
non-aggression pact and following Hitlers lead, Josef Stalin invaded Poland in 
September 1939.  Seeking to gain Lithuanian loyalty and consolidate his hold on the tiny 
state, Stalin returned the Polish owned Vilnius region to Lithuania in exchange for 
basing privileges for the Red Army.  In July 1940, after Stalins communists executed a 
synthetic revolution,5 Lithuania applied for acceptance in the USSR as the Lithuanian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).  Immediately Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells 
published the U.S. position by denouncing,  the devious processes where under the 
political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics were 
to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors.6  These events 
are significant for understanding Kaliningrad.  First, Vilnius became a de facto region 
within both the Lithuanian SSR and later independent Lithuania.  Second, the Vilnius 
region, coupled with the Versailles borders, forms the border between Lithuania and what 
eventually became Kaliningrad.  Finally, these events call into question the actions of 
western leaders concerning negotiations toward the wars conclusion. 
                                                 
5 Vardys, 50.  This term applies to the bogus elections that took place in each of 
the three Baltic republics on 14-15 July 1940. 
6 Ibid., 53. 
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As the fighting wore on and an Allied victory seemed inevitable, the Big Three 
began discussions about the future of the European map.  First broached at Tehran, Soviet 
ownership of Königsberg received tacit approval at Yalta and formal acceptance at 
Potsdam.  Roosevelt and Churchill remained noncommittal to Stalins request during the 
Tehran conference in 1943 and insisted that territorial issues be decided at the peace 
talks.  Fourteen months later, however, it seemed likely that Königsberg would fall within 
the Soviet sphere.  Describing the US position at the Yalta Conference, then Secretary of 
State Edward Stettinius remarked, In regard to German territory to be turned over to 
Poland we favored limiting this compensation to East Prussia except for Königsberg, 
which we expected the Soviet Union to request.7  Finally, in August 1945 during the 
Potsdam Conference, Stalin asked to have his request for Königsberg granted. 
That the allies had to accommodate Stalins request is indisputable.  At Yalta, 
Soviet commitment to the Pacific campaign at the end of European hostilities was 
paramount.  Fixing Stalins obligation required creative and tough diplomacy.  In a larger 
sense, the western leaders were very pragmatic.  By the time they met in Potsdam, the 
Red Army occupied the three Baltic States and Poland; establishing the peoples 
democracies throughout Eastern Europe was a priority for Stalin and the greatest 
political pressure on the western leaders was for a unified solution for an independent 
Poland. 
However, the way in which western leaders acquiesced vis-à-vis Königsberg 
speaks volumes about their view of post war Europe and ignorance about the Soviet 
                                                 
7 Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1949), 41. 
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system.  A critical flaw revolves around the connivance of the western powers regarding 
Stalins warm-water complex.8  When Stalin first requested Soviet control over 
Königsberg at Tehran, he advocated the Soviet need for a warm water port at the expense 
of Germany.  This was the very excuse President Truman used to justify his Königsberg 
decisions at Potsdam by explaining to the American people that it was right to satisfy 
the age old Russian yearning for an ice-free port.9  American diplomat George Kennan 
was incensed.  He observed that Russia already had a number of substantially ice-free 
ports: Ventspils, Liepaya, and Baltiisky.  Königsberg was 49 kilometers from the open 
sea at the end of an artificial canal that freezes several months of the year and requires 
icebreakers to keep it open. 
 Such was the power of the Big Three, that they could not only move 
borders, create spheres of influence, cause millions of Germans to exist or 
disappear  they could also melt ice at Königsberg.  This mutual fantasy 
was eventually made into a fact in the Soviet Encyclopedia of 1953, which 
declared Königsberg ice-free.  Kennan drew an obvious conclusion: If 
anyone thought, after 1945, that he saw ice in the canal at Königsberg, he 
didnt. 10 
 
Extending Kennans observations to include the three Baltic states reveals another 
major flaw in the Königsberg decision: those states each have ice free ports of their own.  
Here the true hypocrisy of the events and poor diplomacy of the decisions appear.  Not 
only was the west willing to ignore their previous rhetoric about the illegal annexations in 
                                                 
8 Sir John Wheeler-Bennet, The Semblance of Peace (New York: St. Martins 
Press, 1972), 326. 
9 Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1975), 
158. 
10 Ibid., 159. 
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1940 in return for Stalins cooperation, but they compounded their error when they paved 
the way for Königsberg to be administered directly from Moscow vice being absorbed by 
another SSR, specifically Lithuania. 
As early as January 1944, Prime Minister Churchill mentioned the very strong 
line which he had taken at the beginning of 1942 against a British commitment in favor 
of the absorption of [the Baltic] states by Russia at that time  He said that over the past 
two years his own feelings had altered.11  He recounted the critical Russian victories 
during the war and that they were about to expel the last of the Germans and occupy the 
Baltics.  Most importantly, he reiterated the fact that no mention of those states took 
place at Tehran although any such plan would clearly include them in the Russian 
dominion.  
With the last Wehrmacht withdrawal from the Baltic region in 1944, U.S. 
Ambassador to Moscow, William Averell Harriman, offered his opinion on the regions 
future, It would seem that we should face realistically the far reaching implications of 
the Soviet position and adjust our policies accordingly.12  Further, John Hickerson, 
Deputy Director of Office of European Affairs said,  It is not a question of whether we 
like it: I personally dont like it although I recognize the Soviet Government has 
arguments on its side.  The point is it has been done and nothing which it is within the 
power of the United States Government to do can undo it.13 
                                                 
11 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War Vol. III 
(London: Her Majestys Stationary Office, 1971), 112. 
12 Wheeler-Bennet, 207. 
13 Ibid., 208. 
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By writing off the Baltics as an inconsequential part of an undifferentiated Soviet 
mass, ceding Königsberg to Stalin was a straightforward, simple solution.  Königsberg 
was a drop of water absorbed by the Soviet sponge  the simple addition of 15,000 square 
kilometers to the USSR.  Ironically, Moscow was prepared to claim Königsberg on 
grounds that ethnic Lithuanians once inhabited the region.  This demand proved to be 
unnecessary, however, since neither Churchill or Truman asked for justification of this 
annexation to the Soviet Union even when the province was incorporated not into 
Lithuania but into the distant Russian republic14 The first tragedy of Kaliningrad today 
was its formation as an endogenous part of the USSR. 
The western officials viewed Stalins USSR as a legitimate and enduring state 
within the international system.  As such, they believed administrative control over 
Königsberg was irrelevant.  This lack of attention to how the Soviet Union operated, its 
system of independent SSRs, its regions, areas, and zones led to the false conclusion 
that Königsbergs role within the Soviet system was immaterial.  Todays Kaliningrad 
dilemma would have been avoidable had the west better appreciated the historical 
significance of the region and the political organization of the USSR.  Incorporating 
Königsberg into the Lithuanian SSR would have granted Stalin de facto even if not de 
jure control over the territory. 
3.  Sovietization 
For the next 45 years, complete sovietization of the region took place.  After 
changing the Oblasts name to Kaliningrad in honor of Mikhail Kalinin, former President 
of the Supreme Soviet, Stalin imprisoned or expelled the German inhabitants and 
                                                 
14 Vardys, 59. 
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replaced them with displaced Russians, Belarussians, and Ukrainians.  As an integral part 
of Stalins five-year plans, Kaliningrad and its neighbors were heavily industrialized and 
militarized.  Shipbuilding, manufacturing and fishing became the major industries.  
Between 1947 and 1970, production growth in Kaliningrad averaged over 200 percent 
per year for industry and about 100 percent per year in agriculture.15  Because there were 
no new enterprises left to establish and because scientific-technical reinforcement of 
production was rather slow, by the mid-1970s Kaliningrad was only an average 
industrial-agricultural region within the Soviet Union. 16 
Exposed to Western Europe, however, the Soviet Baltic received an inordinate 
share of resources and enjoyed a living standard relatively higher than other parts of the 
country.  It became a façade, behind which the rest of the decaying society hid.  Home to 
the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the 11th Guards Army, at its peak over 300,000 military 
personnel lived and worked in the tiny region.  However, because of the paranoid nature 
of the Soviet military it remained a restricted area inaccessible to most everyone.  By the 
time of perestroika and glasnost, Kaliningrad was a secretive expanse of the Soviet 
military-industrial complex.  Four decades of Soviet-style improvements would make it 
impossible to undo the miscues of Potsdam. 
4.  Post-Soviet Kaliningrad 
Unlike the conclusion of the two world wars where a handful of victors divided 
Europe, the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
                                                 
15 Gennady M. Fedorov, The Social and Economic Development of 
Kaliningrad, in Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region, ed. Pertti Joenniemi 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996) 32. 
16 Ibid., 33. 
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decided for themselves.  As the Soviet sphere deflated around it, Kaliningrads future was 
hardly in doubt.  Early on, some suggested that Kaliningrad become an autonomous 
region within the Russian Federation or a multi-state condominium or even a fourth 
Baltic republic.  Although Poland, Germany, and Lithuania could make strong historical 
claims to Kaliningrad, none of them acted.  Moscow would view any such move as an 
open attack on Russias territorial integrity.  Königsberg failed to merit allied attention at 
the end of WWII; Kaliningrad failed to merit anyones attention at the end of the Soviet 
empire. 
No border dispute existed with either Lithuania or Poland.  The Poles were 
satisfied with their state carved out after WWII.  Newly independent Lithuania 
revalidated their constitution of 1930 and declared the 1940 elections invalid thus fixing 
their borders from the former period.  For Germany, it was politically impossible to 
regain Kaliningrad as East Prussia since they were still wrestling with rejoining east and 
west.  Another factor that made Kaliningrad unappealing was its population.  The forced 
immigration of ethnic Russian laborers and engineers during the Soviet period, not to 
mention the huge number of uniformed personnel, combined with its closed nature, made 
Kaliningrad more Russian than Baltic and certainly not Lithuanian, Polish or German.  
Ninety four percent of Kaliningrads population was Russian, Belorussian, or Ukrainian 
in 1989.  Those numbers had not changed in the previous 10 years.17  None of the states 
with any legitimate historical claim had any interest in adding 900,000 ethnic Russians to 
their populations.  Further, the huge military presence created a sizable obstacle for  
                                                 
17 Ibid., 37. 
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anyone with aims on Kaliningrad.  While Moscow could relocate ground forces, the huge 
Baltic fleet was another matter.  As a military base, Kaliningrad eliminated the need for 
the Soviets to develop another naval facility of this size and scope in the southeastern 
Baltic.  Even if Moscow had been inclined to move the fleet, there was nowhere to go.  
Of course, Moscow was not keen on abandoning its investment in Kaliningrad.  
Economically it produced little.  Militarily it was a strongpoint in Soviet, then Russian, 
defense.  Kaliningrads military role spurred the next topic of concern for its neighbors. 
D.  FROM FORTRESS TO GARRISON 
As the Russian military evacuated their bases throughout Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states, Kaliningrad became home to the bulk of the Soviet eras front line forces.  
This buildup caused consternation among not only Kaliningrads neighbors but among 
western powers as well.  The most alarmist observers claimed that Russian forces were a 
clear offensive capability and thus a severe threat to regional stability.  Such paranoia 
arguably played a large part in Poland and the Baltic States petitions for NATO 
accession.  The contention that Kaliningrad presents a military threat to the region is, 
however, largely unfounded. 
In the 1990s, as personnel and equipment poured into Kaliningrad from points 
north and west, the Baltic nations ignored the concentration of military assets 
accumulating in their backyard.  As the euphoria of a return to independence subsided 
and the pragmatism of consolidating and deepening these democracies surfaced, Baltic 
leaders looked over their shoulders and saw a viable military threat amassed in 
Kaliningrad.  Immediately the cry went out for demilitarization.  Of course, Moscow 
cried foul.  Quite correctly, Russia pointed to the basic European arms control regime, the 
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Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, to highlight the fact that the military assets 
in Kaliningrad were well below CFE levels.  Having abstained as CFE signatories, the 
three Baltic States nevertheless attacked Kaliningrads military posture as threatening and 
destabilizing.  Had any of the three Baltics States joined the CFE regime, the numbers in 
Kaliningrad would be much lower.  Russian military elites insisted that Kaliningrad was a 
critical asset for Russias security.  Nevertheless, Russia has made good faith efforts in 
reducing its armed forces in Kaliningrad.  Table 1 indicates the reductions. 
Not only has Moscow reduced the physical numbers of military assets but also 
several other factors limit Kaliningrads military punch.  First, Russian budget difficulties 
in general, and the defense budget in particular, have led to an underpaid and demoralized 
force.  Nowhere is this trend more acute than in Kaliningrad Oblast.  Soldiers are not only 
working two and three additional jobs to supplement their income and provide for their 
families but it is not uncommon to see uniformed soldiers begging on the city streets.  
Additionally, the perpetrators of the myriad illegal activities that are rampant throughout 
the Oblast have found a pool of cheap labor in the form of Russian servicemen willing to 
do whatever necessary to survive.  Military officials turn a blind eye because they 
recognize they cannot offer any alternative to the young conscripts.  Second, the 
proposed 500,000 man draw down scheduled for the next three to five years will further 
degrade the Russian military in Kaliningrad which will take the largest percentage of cuts 
along with Siberia and the Far East.18  As Russia begins to implement a program of 
                                                 
18 Alexander Golts, The Russian Militarys Exercises in Futility, The Russian 
Journal, February 24  March 2, 2001; available from  Johnsons Russia List (JRL) News 
service, Silver Spring, MD. 
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professional military development and lessen their dependence on conscription, the short-
term vacuum created by such a drastic change in personnel structure makes Kaliningrad 
 Assets 1991 1996 
Units    
 Armor 2 Divisions 1 Division 
 Artillery 1 Division 3 Brigades 
 Airborne 1 Brigade 0 
 SS Missiles 3 Brigades 1 Brigade 
Equipment    
 Artillery pieces 677 426
 Combat Aircraft 155 28
 Tactical Submarines 40 6
 Strategic Submarines 2 0
 Principal Surface Combatants 39 31
 Patrol and Coastal Combatants 150 42
 Mine Warfare Platforms 120 60
 Amphibious Ships 21 8
 
Table 1.  Changes in Kaliningrads Military Strength19 
 
forces even less threatening.  Third, a decline in military preparedness, especially in the 
Baltic Fleet, limits any potential Russian threat from Kaliningrad.  The fleet is incapable 
of putting even the smallest flotilla to sea for any length of time.20  The lack of fuel 
grounded aircraft assigned to the fleet and troops rarely participate in training exercises.21  
                                                 
19 Alexander Sergounin, Russias Regionalization: The International 
Dimension, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers, undated, 7; available 
from https://wwwc.cc.columbia. edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/sea02/sea02.html. 
20 During SailBoston 2000 the Boston Globe ran an article about a Russian 
Navy training vessel participating in the tall ships regatta that actively sought donations 
of money and food to pay and feed the crew.  If a sailing training vessel participating in 
such a high visibility event cannot be provided for, what is one to believe about the status 
of Russias warships? 
21 Russian Baltic Fleet Aviation Reduces Training Flights Due to Fuel 
Shortage, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 July 2000; available from 
http://infoweb9.newsbank.com. 
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The war in Chechnya seems to be the only place for military personnel to hone their skills 
and it took a private donation from a Kaliningrad executive to build essential base 
infrastructure in the town of Gusev.22  Fourth, the new military doctrine issued in 2000 
focuses on internal threats.  Preventing further disintegration of the Russian Federation 
now receives a higher priority than exerting Russian influence worldwide.  Resource 
allocation priorities go to efforts at maintaining the federation in its current state.  Fifth, 
tension in the east and south draws Moscows attention.  Sino-Russian relations in the 
Russian Far East present a greater threat to Russian security than do Russian relations 
with the west.  Of course, the conflict in the Balkans and the Caucusus point directly to 
physical security threats by way of armed conflict vice the war of words in the west.  
Moscow has resolved not to allow the Chechen Republic independence.  Oil projects in 
the region promise far greater returns than any economic projects in Kaliningrad and 
Russia is willing to intervene where they feel appropriate i.e. Georgia and fight where 
they feel it necessary i.e. Chechnya.  
Further, poor economic performance coupled with the growth of criminalization 
could present a problem for the region.  In addition to the social ills described above that 
are ready for export (HIV, petty theft, organized crime etc.), there have been examples of 
conventional weapons proliferation as the armed forces sell off their equipment.  Aware 
of the problem, the international community has not emplaced programs or law 
enforcement methods with which to stem the flow of illegal weapons out of Kaliningrad.  
                                                 
22 Untitled, AVN Military News Agency, Moscow, December 28, 2000; available 
from http:// infoweb9.newsbank.com. 
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Its maritime location makes it an ideal site for the export of such weapons; to date, 
Russian authorities cannot or will not enforce control. 
Table 2 depicts the current force levels in the Baltic Littoral.  In comparison to 
neighboring countries, Kaliningrad hardly represents a military threat.  Of course, by 
adding nearly 800,000 Russian soldiers from other parts of the Federation, the numbers 
can look more intimidating.  Proponents of Kaliningrads demilitarization and its role as a 
regional military security threat do not argue that the entire Russian army is a threat  
only Kaliningrad forces.  These are hardly the forces capable of executing a Blitzkrieg 
through the Baltic littoral and recreating either of the monumental Battles of 
Tannenberg. 








Poland 240650 4318 325 13
Sweden 53100 2604 253 24
Finland 31700 1293 85 11
Kaliningrad 18000 1790 112 12
Lithuania 10130 38 0 2
Latvia 5730 15 0 0
Estonia 4800 39 0 0
 
Table 2.  Force Comparisons Among Selected Baltic Nations23 
 
There are now some 18,000 active military personnel in Kaliningrad.  There is no 
sense at all that the military establishment is a threat, either to neighboring states or to the 
existing social order in Kaliningrad.  The military no longer has a Soviet attitude, but 
                                                 
23 Jussi S. Jauhiainen, The Conversion of Military Areas in the Baltic States, 
The NEBI Yearbook 1999, ed. Lars Hedegaard (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1999), 331. 
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on the contrary shares the attitudes of the population in general.24  While their role as a 
military force charged with national defense remains unchanged, gone is the massive 
secrecy and closed military society that formerly surrounded Kaliningrad as one of the 
USSRs premier forward operating bases.  From being an area of great strategic interest 
to military specialists during the cold war by virtue of its geographic position and its role 
as a forward operating base for the Soviets, Kaliningrad is now a moderate military 
facility without any real capability for uncoordinated offensive action.  Militarily, 
Kaliningrad is to Russia what Hawaii is to the United States:  a nationally strategic asset 
of interest to enemies but incapable of executing, much less sustaining, a military 
operation against its neighbors. 
With its territoriality largely undisputed and its military capabilities no longer a 
credible, offensive threat, Kaliningrad may look poised to be a stable entity within the 
Baltic littoral.  However, the Oblast plays a significant role in the overall security picture 
of the region.  Potential confrontation surrounds Kaliningrad and NATO expansion 
because NATO expansion threatens to further cut off Kaliningrad from Moscow.  Many 
destabilizing socio-economic security threats to the region emanate from the Oblast.  To 
avoid these confrontations and to reduce these threats requires an active, aggressive 
action plan between Russia and the Western European actors involved. 
                                                 
24 Chris Donnelly, Kaliningrad from a Security Perspective, in The EU and 
Kaliningrad, eds. James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal Trust for 
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II.  REGIONAL SECURITY 
A.  HARD SECURITY 
Hard security is that posture necessary to protect the territorial sovereignty of a 
state.  Soft security is those socio-economic issues that plague all nations and can destroy 
states from within.  Hard security generally involves military and paramilitary forces, 
collective defense and collective security alliances, and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) including the politics and strategies they require.  Soft security is a broad 
concept that encompasses the complete spectrum of nonmilitary threats to a region or 
state.  Soft security normally deals with the environment, public health, crime, 
immigration, illegal trade etc.  
1.  NATOs Open Door 
Western observers generally agree that Kaliningrad no longer poses a significant 
military threat and that the Oblast is of little military value.  Based on traditional security 
thinking, the territory and its forces cannot pose a serious offensive threat.  The forces in 
the region, recently reorganized, are clearly defensive in nature.  Even Russian military 
elites openly admit that territorial defense is the Kaliningrad forces mandate.  Their new 
organization, somewhat similar to the U.S. Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) concept combines all the forces, regardless of branch, under a unified 
commander.  In the case of Kaliningrad, that Commander is the Baltic Fleet Admiral.  
Interestingly the name of the new organization remains the Baltic Fleet.  From now 
on the Baltic Fleet will consist of well balanced units including ships, sea aviation, air 
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defense facilities, coastal and ground troops of various types, classes and subclasses, 
under the unified command of the operative, technical and rear provision control.25  
Thus, if Kaliningrad has transformed from a fortress to a garrison, and the 
remaining military organization is clearly a defensive one, is there a hard security 
problem vis-à-vis Kaliningrad?  Simply answered: yes.  The answer comes when one 
looks not at Kaliningrad and its military role in the Baltic, for that role is extremely 
limited, but at what kinds of hard security issues are unfolding all around Kaliningrad.  
The most important is NATO expansion. 
That NATOs door is open to all nations in Europe is indisputable.  Every 
diplomat from President Bush to Lord Robertson has reiterated the North Atlantic 
Alliances position.  In a speech at Vilnius University in July 1997, former Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright said, that the whole NATO expansion process will not be 
complete until all the democracies in Europe are part of it.  Of course, at that time, she 
was referring directly to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  As recently as 
October 2000, Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering stated, We are determined to 
keep the doors to our core institutions open to democracies that can contribute to our 
overall security, prosperity and freedom.26  And in particular reference to the three 
                                                 
25 Valery Gromak, The Western Outpost, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 December 
1999; available from JRL News service. 
26 Speech by Thomas Pickering available from http://www.usis.usemb.se/ 
wireless/500/eur508.htm 
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Baltic States, the Political Committee of NATO stated that, Lithuania is the 
forerunner in the next round of NATO expansion.27 
Of course, Russias position is quite contrary.  According to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, Russias stance is that we oppose the expansion of NATO.  I dont 
understand well at all the role of NATO today.  After all NATO was created as a 
counterweight to the Soviet Union and the eastern Bloc.  Today there is neither the Soviet 
Union nor the Eastern Blocthe causes which gave rise to NATO no longer exist.  But 
NATO exists and is expanding toward our border.28 
2.  NATO and Kaliningrad 
Moscow opposes NATOs expansion in general; but expansion concerning 
Kaliningrad highlights the Russians fears.  Whether or not those fears are rational or 
justified depends on which end of Europe one resides.  Three arguments are most 
compelling for NATO expansion vis-à-vis Kaliningrad.  First, not only will NATO touch 
Russian borders but also the nature of Kaliningrads geography will send a strong signal 
that the west is merely looking to isolate and exclude Russia from the rest of Europe.  
Second, the similarities with the Cuban Missile Crises are striking; there is reason to 
believe that Moscow can apply the same logic used by President Kennedy in 1962.  
However, this time the final act may not be so beneficial for the west.  Finally, the 
physical isolation of Kaliningrad will create another Berlin Scenario; physically cut off 
from mainland Russia, Kaliningrad will become a vulnerable exclave to Russia or 
                                                 
27 NATO Political Committee Says Lithuania Ready, RFE/RL, 26 November 
2000; available from http://www.rferl.org. 
28 Russian President Reiterates Concerns at NATOs Expansion, BBC 
Monitoring, 29 October 2000; available from http://infoweb9.newsbank.com. 
 22
enclave within NATO.  This vulnerability places Kaliningrad in an untenable strategic 
position as a NATO enemy surrounds the oblast. 
a.  Isolation 
Once the Soviet Union dissolved, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
believed western societies would immediately see Russia as different from the Soviet 
Union and would quickly distinguish between the two.  In fact, to this day that distinction 
is lost on many people and, unfortunately, some influential diplomats and politicians.  
Western nations, especially the United States, did not embrace Yeltsins Russia rather 
they shunned it.  Only partly due to ignorance, most of the western indifference stemmed 
from internal Russian corruption in privatization plans, heavy handed Soviet style politics 
and the economic collapse of the ruble.  Investment dried up, promises went unfulfilled, 
and diplomacy became a synonym for polite conversation. 
NATO has exacerbated this problem for Russia.  When Boris Yeltsin 
agreed to the round of NATO expansion that included Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, he did so with the understanding that the west would embrace the good faith 
efforts of the Russian Federation.  Moscow tacitly accepted the last round of enlargement 
after NATO provided Russia with a number of political and military concessions.  The 
NATO-Russia Charter (or Founding Act) signed in Paris on 27 May 1997 legitimized a 
broadening of NATO including an increased presence in the Baltic rim and it justified 
Russias territorial defense of Kaliningrad.29  The Charter specifically states that, The 
Member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan, and no reason to 
                                                 
29 Joenniemi, Kaliningrad Puzzle, 8. 
 23
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.30  Additionally, it calls for 
adapting the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty as soon as practical to ensure 
military strength remains commensurate with the needs of overall European security.  
Implicitly it means NATO will not permanently station formations of non-indigenous 
troops within new member states as a matter of policy.  
As NATO prepares for the next round of expansion, it is disregarding 
Russian objections to the process.  Moscow interprets the NATO attitude as a blatant 
attempt to minimize the Federations role in geopolitics.  President Putin further 
articulated this view, Ten years ago we decided, for some reason, that everyone heartily 
loves us.  But this turned out to be wrong.  We have to clearly understand our national 
interests, spell them out and fight for them.31  According to Moscow, both the Baltic 
States and Kaliningrad have come to symbolize western disdain for Russian security with 
NATO courting the former at the peril of the latter.  The west is ignoring Russian 
concerns; thus, Moscow views these actions as attempts at isolating and weakening the 
Russian state.  Founded in fact or not, Russian nationalists paint a dim picture of western 
opinion regarding Russia.  NATOs attempts at including Russia in the European 
collective security regime have meant only partnership as opposed to membership.  This 
distinction may seem subtle on the surface but for proud, nuclear-armed Russia, it is 
significant.  Limited partnership is one step below where Russians believe they deserve to 
                                                 
30 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO 
and the Russian Federation; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/ comm/ m970527/ 
uk-text.htm. 
31 Geoffrey York, Bush, Putin seen headed for trouble over missiles, The Globe 
and Mail, 8 Jan 2001; available from JRL News service. 
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be.  The Russian perception is one of a new division of Europe and a return to bipolarity.  
NATO appears to see an enemy in the east  no longer the Soviet Union but her 
successor state, Russia. 
b.  Another Cuba 
NATO expansion that not only surrounds Kaliningrad but also creates 
abutting borders with mainland Russia will create an untenable security situation in the 
region.  Much like America could not tolerate the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles on 
the island of Cuba, so too will NATO forces at Russias doorstep create an unparalleled 
security threat for Moscow.  According to the Russian military, the current array of forces 
in NATO and the Baltic region makes Kaliningrad indefensible.  Should NATO 
expansion include Lithuania and thus surround Kaliningrad, the Russian military 
contends that it will be impossible to prevent NATO from simply overwhelming 
Kaliningrad.  Should Moscow respond to Kaliningrads NATO encirclement with the 
same vigor President Kennedy did in response to Soviet weapons on Cuba, the impact 
can be devastating for myriad reasons ranging from mild, like a setback in U.S./NATO - 
Russia relations to explosive, like an armed conflict. 
There are, however, two caveats to this analogy.  First, American and 
Russian experiences with homeland vulnerability are quite different.  Soviet missiles in 
Cuba were an unprecedented and highly visible threat to Americans.  Regardless of the 
fact that ballistic missiles could reach the continental United States from myriad points in 
the Soviet Union, their presence in Cuba, only 90 miles from U.S. soil, created panic.  
Russians, however, have become accustomed to the close proximity of threatening 
neighbors.  Second, Khrushchev intended the Cuba deployment to shift the strategic 
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nuclear balance away from U.S. numerical superiority by placing some of the few Soviet 
missiles closer to the United States.  Although NATO expansion into the three Baltic 
States will not shift the global strategic balance, the thought process currently underway 
within the foreign policy branches of both Moscow and Washington is strikingly similar 
to that in 1962. 
Russia seems convinced that NATO has targeted vulnerable Kaliningrad 
for an impending invasion.  The Russian military deployed their most advanced surface 
to air missile, the S-300, in greater density than anywhere else in the Federation.  
Additionally, in the summer of 1999, Russia conducted the Zapad-99 or West-99 military 
war game that simulated a NATO attack against Kaliningrad.  During the maneuvers, 
Russias forces resorted to nuclear strikes and cruise missile attacks throughout Europe 
and the United States.  The use of tactical nuclear weapons during West-99 supports U.S. 
defense analysts assessment that Russia views these tactical weapons as war fighting 
arms in contrast to its strategic nuclear weapons that serve primarily as deterrent forces.32 
In an eerie reenactment of 1962, the Washington Times unleashed 
accusations of a Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployment in Kaliningrad as early as 
June 2000.33  While the United States steadfastly supports the claims of its intelligence 
reporting, Russia remains in complete denial.  Since 1995, Moscow has threatened to 
station tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and it appears they have made good on 
their promise.  A document titled A Concept of Actions Against Threat to National 
                                                 
32 Bill Gertz, Russia Transfers Nuclear Arms to Baltics, Washington Times, 3 
January 2001; available from JRL News service. 
33 Ibid. 
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Security of the Russian Federation prepared by the Defense Research Institute in 
Koroliov proposed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kaliningrad and on 
ships of the Baltic Fleet.34  Since Moscow denies the U.S. claims, the exact motivation 
for such a move is unclear.  
Impending NATO expansion to the Baltic States and Kaliningrads 
subsequent isolation presents a clear security threat to Russia just as Soviet missiles on 
Cuba presented an intolerable threat to the U.S.  Using strong-arm diplomacy, Moscow 
deployed nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad to first demonstrate the seriousness of Russias 
opposition and, second, to deter the Baltic States from joining the Alliance for fear of 
repercussions. 
Unfortunately for Russia, the west detected the weapons move before 
Moscow could play its political hand that was most likely designed to create leverage for 
dissuading NATO expansion.  Instead, the move created unintended consequences by 
reinvigorating the Baltic drive for NATO membership.  Latvian Defense Minister, Girts 
Valdis Kristovkis stated, In the end it will leave the impression among western policy 
makers that the Baltic States have no basis to trust Russia.  Russia is showing that their 
security policy is unpredictable and deceptive.35  The deployment puts the issue of 
Baltic membership in NATO high on their agenda and bolsters their case for inclusion. 
                                                 
34 Algirdas Gricius, Russias Exclave in the Baltic Region. in Kaliningrad: The 
European Amber Region, ed. Pertti Joenniemi (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 171.  Gricius 
acknowledges that although Moscow does not recognize the Defense Research Institute, 
it does have ties with Russian Military Intelligence. 
35 Russian nukes in Kaliningrad puts Baltics NATO bid back on front burner, 
Agence France Press (AFP), 8 January 2001; available from JRL News service. 
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c.  Berlin Revisited 
The final argument against NATO expansion is perhaps the most 
plausible.  With Lithuanias accession to NATO, Kaliningrad will be cutoff by the 
Polish-Lithuanian border.  Once cutoff, even the smallest naval force can prevent access 
by sea and Kaliningrads physical isolation will be complete.  Almost effortlessly, NATO 
could strangle Kaliningrad. 
This helps to explain why the Russians are so hostile to the NATO 
expansion into the Baltics.  If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, it is likely 
that the Russians will demand secure lines of communication from their main territory to 
Kaliningrad.  For their part, Poland and Lithuania are very sensitive to the issue of transit.  
This is a substantive argument, insists Marek Karp, director of the Center for Eastern 
Studies.  Russia could tell NATO that our military transport passes through Poland, 
and thus the presence of NATO in this zone threatens our transport lines, threatens our 
garrison in Kaliningrad.36  It is difficult to understand how the Baltic region could 
remain stable if Russia were not assured of some reliable land lines of communication 
with Kaliningrad, which must involve transit through either Poland or Lithuania. 
The military is also concerned about the proximity of NATO and Russian 
forces should Lithuania join.  The expansion of the NATO zone of responsibility to the 
East will create a situation similar to what we had during the Cold War, when the 
confronting groups of forces were deployed against each other and were maintained at a 
high level of combat readiness for attack, Colonel General Igor Rodionov, then Russia's 
                                                 
36 Stanley Kober, NATO Flashpoint No. 3: Kaliningrad, Foreign Policy 
Briefing, No. 46, Cato Institute, 12; available from http://www.cato.org/fpb/fpb-42.htm. 
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defense minister, told a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bergen, Norway, in 
September 1996.  He continued, The Russian forces deployed in the [sic] Kaliningrad 
region will come in direct contact with the joint armed forces of NATO.37 
People who think that another Berlin scenario will be manageable, just 
as fighting was avoidable during the Cold War, should remember that Berlin is not the 
only precedent.  Germany's pretext for war against Poland in 1939 focused on Danzig, an 
ethnic German city then separated from the German heartland by Polish territory.  The 
ostensible reasons for war then were uncomfortably similar to the situation that exists 
today: the status of an exclave (then Danzig, now Kaliningrad) and the treatment of 
ethnic minorities (then Germans, now Russians.)  Worrisome, indeed, would be a Russian 
position that a Kaliningrad corridor is vital to the survival of Russian citizens in the 
Oblast.  Should Moscow cloak this argument in the name of human rights, then the issue 
becomes that much more volatile and diplomatically dicey. 
Another danger is confrontation arising out of a genuine misperception.  
The danger inherent in political games around the Baltic states is that both NATO and 
Russia will have to bluff to reach their aims, and may misinterpret the intentions of each 
other and thus provoke a conflict.  The debate surrounding the tactical nuclear weapons 
in Kaliningrad further supports the danger of misperception vis-à-vis Kaliningrad.  
Without open dialog on this issue, each side will engage in the all-too-familiar cold war 
bluff and rhetoric tactics. 
                                                 
37 Richard J. Krickus, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Kaliningrad Question, 
Columbia International Affairs Online Working Papers, 1998; available from 
https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc /ciao/wps/krr01/krr01.html. 
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3.  Rational or Irrational Fears? 
Russian fears about NATO expansion and Kaliningrad are irrational for several 
reasons.  First, to gain Russian support for the last round of NATO expansion, negotiators 
for both sides painstakingly worked to find language and concessions that met their 
military and political priorities.  There is no reason to believe this same process cannot 
work again during the next round.  Unless President Putin is unwavering in his 
pessimistic opinion about the wests views toward Russia, his early record points toward 
cooperation and not confrontation.  Of course, Russias domestic politics are difficult to 
predict and unless President Putin can build strong support, he may not enjoy the same 
power monopoly his predecessor built.  Further, the Russian military continues to wield 
significant influence in Russian politics.  Should they prevail in convincing Russian 
nationalists that NATO expansion does indeed pose a clear and present danger to 
Kaliningrad, it is unlikely that Brussels and Moscow can reach a satisfactory agreement.  
One possible tempering factor to the militarys influence may be the recently elected 
Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, former commander of the 
Baltic Fleet and Putin ally.  Yegorov straddles both the military and political front when 
it comes to Kaliningrad.  Should Putin wish for a negotiated settlement, Yegorovs 
political loyalty to Putin and his influence as a senior military commander may garner 
enough popular support to reach an agreement. 
Second, NATO can allay Russian fears by reemphasizing the no nukes policy in 
the 1997 Founding Act.  Further, there is no need to station non-indigenous troops in any 
of the Baltic States.  Assuming NATO asks the Baltic States, specifically Lithuania, to 
join the alliance, their defense will rest in Article V deterrence alone.  Drawing a parallel 
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with West Germany during the cold war, western opponents to NATO expansion use the 
argument that NATO cannot defend the Baltics without troops physically positioned 
throughout the region.  Looking strategically and operationally, NATO could not defend 
the Baltic States from a Russian offensive with troops on the ground.  The Russian 
military, even in its disheveled state, could run over the Baltic defense forces and reach 
the sea in a matter of hours.  With shear mass they would overwhelm any defenders  
whether or not they wore NATO patches on their sleeves.  The only thing saving the 
Baltics is the threat of severe repercussions by NATO against an aggressor  namely 
Russia.  Therefore, NATO need not station troops on the territory of those states 
protected by Article V of the Washington Treaty.  Deterrence alone must suffice. 
Third, a shared NATO-Russia border that surrounds a small piece of Russian 
territory causes military planners great consternation.  Not only is Kaliningrad vulnerable 
to outside attack, its utility as a military base will diminish once access becomes more 
restrictive.  NATO should tie the access question to the accession of new members.  
NATO already insists upon resolution of all border disputes before they will proffer any 
membership invitation.  A dispute over crossing borders and transiting through anothers 
sovereign territory can, and should, fit into this prerequisite of membership.  Directed 
mostly toward Lithuania, NATO can apply the same criteria to Estonia and Latvia to 
demonstrate consistency and sensitivity to Russian transit concerns.  Additionally, Poland 
should be encouraged to embrace similar initiatives since they, too, share a border with 
Kaliningrad and access through Poland is another attractive option for Russia. 
As NATO struggles to redefine its role in Europe, soft security concerns present a 
much more pressing dilemma for both the Atlantic Alliance and Russia.  Having 
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demonstrated a willingness to not only participate in but also lead peace operations, 
NATO has opened an entirely new door of roles and missions.  Dealing with the perverse 
trade in women, arms, and drugs that permeate the Baltic littoral (and have Kaliningrad 
as a hub) makes NATO intervention to arrest such actions an interesting question.  
Although very unlikely, NATO could take on the role of Europes policeman and tackle a 
wide range of non-military operations  drug enforcement, arms smuggling, and 
prostitution.  Nevertheless, each of these soft security concerns threatens the individual 
states and destabilizes the region.  Soft security concerns are a much greater threat to 
Baltic stability than armed conflict and territorial incursions; the source of many soft 
security problems around the Baltic is Kaliningrad. 
B.  SOFT SECURITY 
Debates on Baltic security issues no longer pertain exclusively to hard security 
and regular, interstate armed conflicts.  They also encompass many non-defense, soft 
security issues like the environment, crime (including organized crime), and public 
health.  These are the new security threats of the post-bipolar world.  Kaliningrad 
reflects a paradox that soft security issues tend to increase once defense related issues 
decline in salience.38  While the NATO enlargement question presents significant 
challenges, the real threat of military conflict in the Baltic littoral is extremely low.  
Member states surrounding the Baltic Sea recognize this fact; therefore, they have turned 
their attention to the soft security issues that threaten their prosperity and play a 
                                                 
38 Joenniemi, Kaliningrad Puzzle, 10. 
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significant role in the health of Russia-Baltic relations.  Figure 2 highlights the European 
perception of the impact of these soft security threats over the next ten years. 
 
Figure 2.  Effect of soft security threats on Europe39 
 
Kaliningrads social and environmental problems threaten its neighbors.  
Kaliningrad has a reputation for high levels of crime, including organized crime.  There is 
smuggling in amber, alcohol, and cigarettes; drug trafficking; and a gray economy in 
second-hand and stolen cars. Environmental pollution is threatening: Kaliningrad 
discharges approximately 253 million cubic meters of human and industrial waste  two 
                                                 
39 Jochen Prantl, Security and Stability in Northern Europe  A Threat 
Assessment, Program on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, 29; available from 
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/wp25.pdf. 
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thirds of it untreated - into the Baltic Sea annually.  The Oblast is now a major center for 
HIV/AIDS.  Official statistics indicate nearly 3,000 cases of AIDS while experts estimate 
that it may be as much as 6-8 times higher.   
Kaliningrad has the highest level of infection anywhere in Russia.40  Additionally 
it has the second highest rate of drug related crimes, and is first in Europe in confiscated 
drugs.  Death by alcohol poisoning is an unbelievable 70% higher than the Russian 
average.  From 1971 until 1997, life expectancy dropped by 8 years and more people are 
dying there than are being born.  The population has grown slowly, however, because of 
immigration.41  Easy access to Poland and Lithuania is an attractive incentive for 
relocating to Kaliningrad. 
1.  Environment 
The Baltic Sea is particularly sensitive to environmental problems because of its 
cold temperature and low salinity.  Industrial and municipal wastewater plants discharge 
wastewater directly into rivers and seas.  Heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants 
from agriculture, urban centers, and the combustion of fossil fuels accumulate in the sea 
where eutrophication and algae blooms choke sea life and seriously threaten the fishing 
industry in which every Baltic nation participates.  Additionally, the density of the 
chemical pollutants contaminates a significant portion of the sea life in the food chain 
                                                 
40 James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar, The EU and Kaliningrad, (London: 
Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000) 16. 
41 Krickus, 11. 
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that subsequently puts the health of Kaliningraders and their neighbors at risk.42  The 
availability of safe drinking water poses a problem in some parts of the region due to soil 
contamination and lack of sanitation; emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
toxic substances cause trans-boundary air pollution that, like water pollution, impacts 
many Baltic States around Kaliningrad.  
In view of the past military presence in Kaliningrad, there may be problems 
relating to the disposal of nuclear waste and chemical weapons stockpiles.  Although the 
serious nuclear threat stems from over 200 unused reactors in the Kola Peninsula, for 
Kaliningrad to dispose properly of its nuclear waste and unwanted chemical weapons, it 
must cross the Baltic Sea or neighboring Lithuania and/or Poland to reach appropriate 
sites.  Either way, nearby states object to Russian contaminants on or near their territory. 
2.  Organized Crime 
In Kaliningrad, the mafia operates openly and extensively.  The demoralization 
of the large military garrison means that many gangs are either run by or allied with 
criminal officers.  As a result, weapons are freely available and military transport links 
routinely misused for smuggling.43  Heavily armed, well organized criminal gangs 
capable of transporting drugs, arms, and nuclear materials beyond the shores of the Baltic 
Sea represent a serious international security problem and are a disincentive to outside 
investment.  The Oblasts immediate neighbors Poland, Lithuania, and the Nordic 
                                                 
42 The EU and Kaliningrad, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, 21 January 2001, 12; available from http://europa.eu.int/comm 
/external_relations/north_dim/ doc/com2001_0026en01 .pdf. 
 
43 Janes Sentinel, Russia and the CIS, July 1996; available from JRL News 
service. 
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countries fear that criminal gangs may grow in power and operate much like the drug 
cartels do in many parts of Latin America. 
Trafficking in human beings, drugs, stolen vehicles, illegal migration, and 
prostitution are all present.  According to official statistics, the level of crime is 20 
percent higher than the Russian average for organized crime and for crime by minors and 
by people acting under the influence of alcohol.44  Organized crime has a pervasive 
negative effect on the business and investment climate.  Criminality, linked to corruption, 
poses a threat to economic development and the development of a democratic system 
governed by the rule of law. 
Crime in Kaliningrad thrives on weak institutions.  Many critics believe the 
Oblasts special economic arrangement is a massive inducement to crime, corruption, and 
smuggling.  However, many countries have similar economic programs and, despite the 
inducements to criminality that such regimes may contain, manage nonetheless to deal 
with the issue.45  Further, Western observers who have attempted to chronicle serious 
smuggling through Kaliningrad have highlighted such merchandise as drugs, weapons, 
prostitutes, illegal immigrants, and radioactive materials such as plutonium as the 
targeted merchandise for smugglers.  None of these items has any connection with the 
legitimate economy supported by the special economic zone.  Due to its geographic 
                                                 
44 Communication from the Commission to the Council. 
45 Stephen Dewar, Myths in the Baltic, in The EU and Kaliningrad eds. James 
Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 
2000) 188. 
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location, Kaliningrad is well positioned on the international smuggling trail, and appears 
to be fulfilling that role successfully.46 
Large-scale smuggling is prevalent in such commodities as cars, cigarettes, and 
alcohol and the gangs responsible frequently resort to violence to promote and protect 
their interests.  Kaliningrads special economic arrangement has helped these groups gain 
access to these products; not having to pay excise duties motivates the criminal behavior.  
If the regions administration decides to end the economic program in the name of 
eliminating the smuggling problem, the gang activities will most likely move to the black 
market. 
There is evidence that organized crime penetrated the administration of former 
Kaliningrad Governor Leonid Gorbenko.  After three years of miserable results in 
attracting foreign investment, Gorbenko reportedly sold the rights to Kaliningrads oil 
and amber deposits to a company headed by his friends.47  Subsequent to Gorbenkos 
defeat in the November 2000 election, Moscow repealed the deal.  However, it still 
appears clear that the long arm of the mafia reached inside the regional administration. 
3.  Public Health 
The greatest soft security threat for the Baltic littoral is the poor state of public 
health in Kaliningrad and other parts of northwest Russia.  While public health services 
in Kaliningrad are close to the Russian average, the system lags behind western health 
care standards.  Diseases such as tuberculosis, diphtheria, measles, and epidemic 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Gary Peach, Kaliningrad Governor Lets Unknown Devour It All, Moscow 
Times, 15 February 2000; available from LEXIS-NEXIS. 
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paratyphoid are widespread.  Tuberculosis is becoming multi-resistant.  Neither Moscow 
nor the Kaliningrad regional administration has dedicated the human or financial 
resources to combat these diseases.  Drug use and prostitution have led to the spread of 
other communicable diseases.  Kaliningrad is among the worst regions in Russia for 
registered cases of HIV, and is by far the most affected area in the Baltic Sea region with 
the highest rate of new cases. 
Between 1999 and 2000, the number of registered HIV positive cases in Russia 
quadrupled from 15,562 to 80,300.  Experts believe the actual number is ten times higher.  
Russia will have over 1 million infected residents by the end of 2001.48  Accurate 
statistics on the number of HIV positive Russians are difficult to come by.  The truly 
alarming figure is not the number of registered case but the huge increase in the rate of 
reported cases.  The infection rate, extrapolated across the population and high-risk 
groups, is what makes this epidemic so catastrophic. 
Self-destructive behavior and inadequate intervention or education is producing 
self genocide; the Russian HIV epidemic threatens to wipe out a large portion of an 
entire generation.  Unlike the early stages of the AIDS crises in the West, HIV in Russia 
is spread among the countrys burgeoning population of intravenous drug users  an 
estimated 2 to 3 million nationally.49  The majority of these drug users are between 18 
and 30 years old.  A large percentage of that group comes from middle and upper class 
families; many are university students.  Dr. Vadim Pokrovsky, who directed Russias 
                                                 
48 Andrew Meier, The Death of a Nation, Time Europe, 22 January 2000; 
available from JRL News service. 
49 Ibid. 
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federal center for the fight against HIV stated, The HIV epidemic is a tragedy in itself.  
Far worse will be the eventual depopulation of the country.  Not only will those with 
AIDS die, they will not have children.50 
On a macro scale, there is little chance that Russian health problems will spread 
across Europe like the Black Death.  In Kaliningrad, however, the large numbers of 
people in high-risk groups makes the figure of infected persons per square kilometer 
much greater than in Russia.  There are approximately 940,000 residents in Kaliningrads 
15,100 square kilometers.  Since 70 percent of Kaliningrad is unpopulated farm and 
woodlands, 95 percent of Kaliningraders live in 4500 square kilometers.  Therefore, the 
population density is roughly 200 people per square kilometer!51   
The criminal climate of Kaliningrad combined with unemployment, poverty, and 
a sudden relaxation of social and legal taboos has created an environment where high-risk 
behavior consumes a large portion of the population.  AIDS researcher Dr. Irina 
Savchenko says, We are living through a severe crisis of traditional values and a 
mistaken acceptance of a new culture that is influencing the younger generation.  Social 
circumstances are extremely unstable and economic hardships are taking their toll.  
Young men, especially, are psychologically open to the idea of taking drugs.52  While 
past AIDS education focused on women, especially prostitutes, as a means of curbing the 
epidemic, Russian male drug users (of which 80 percent are HIV positive) are more 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Jüri Köll, North European and Baltic Statistics, in The NEBI Yearbook 1999, 
ed. Lars Hedegaard (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1999) 448. 
52 Kester Klomegah, Russia Must See AIDS as Issue of National Security, St. 
Petersburg Times, 1 December 2000; available from JRL News service. 
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likely to share needles, to resist the use of condoms, and to demonstrate a dangerously 
cavalier attitude toward sexually transmitted disease.53  Only about 10 percent of sexually 
active Russians use condoms although they are widely available.  Sociologists wonder 
whether young Russian men can change their widely held concepts of masculinity which 
presently lead them  to take unacceptable risks.54 
Criminal activity, irresponsible behavior, and the concentrated population point to 
the extraordinary spread of HIV and other communicable diseases in Kaliningrad.  By 
adding the liberal border and visa regime currently in place in Kaliningrad, the free 
movement of Kaliningraders to Poland and Lithuania creates the true health threat to the 
Baltic. 
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III.  REGIONAL STABILITY 
A.  SECURITY THROUGH STABILITY 
Stability is a prerequisite for security.  Any nation with an unstable domestic 
situation will inevitably pose a threat to its neighbors through the export of 
socioeconomic cancers and, sometimes, violence.  Instability creates opportunities for 
crises that can easily spillover to neighboring states.  Although it is doubtful that an 
unstable Kaliningrad will lead to guerilla fighting, it will lead to economic isolation and 
social deterioration which will, in turn, destabilize the entire region and create an ever-
present security threat.  The fundamental problem for Kaliningrad is twofold:  it must 
become a stable entity in the Baltic by restructuring and rebuilding its economy and by 
correcting the social and political problems that plague the tiny Oblast. 
B.  SOURCES OF INSTABILITY 
1.  Social and Political 
a.  Hard and Soft Security Threats 
While admittedly challenging, the difficulties associated with hard 
security issues in Kaliningrad and the Baltic are not the predominant obstacle to regional 
stability.  Kaliningrads neighbors, while concerned, do not believe Russia is in a 
position, politically or militarily, to use armed force as an instrument of policy.  Figure 3 
quantifies this perception. 
While the perceived importance of Russias military threat does increase 
when looking to the future, many of this surveys respondents cited the Federations 
eventual recovery and the increase in defense spending that will most likely accompany 
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it.  Their position is similar to asking if NATO poses a threat to Switzerland.  NATO 
certainly has the means to inflict great damage on the Swiss state, but it would never take 
 
Figure 3.  Perception of Russia as a Military Threat in Northern Europe55 
 
such action unless tiny Switzerland grossly violated Article V of the Washington Treaty.  
The threat is real but the likelihood of action is remote.  Likewise, very few believe 
Russia will use military force to settle Baltic disagreements, including Kaliningrad. 
While hard security may not be a serious variable, soft security is a major 
part of the stability equation.  Because the impact of environmental hazards, criminal 
behavior, and the public health crises are having a visible and measurable effect on 
Kaliningrad and its neighbors, they serve as a catalyst for destroying the Oblasts 
stability.  Soft security threats present challenges now, today.  Regional experts generally 
agree upon their dangers.  Neither Moscow nor Brussels refutes the various reports that 
describe the current state of affairs in Kaliningrad.  What concerns them more, however, 
are those potential social and political sources of instability that will arise from the EUs 
eastward expansion, especially regarding Poland and Lithuania that surround 
Kaliningrad. 
                                                 
55 Prantl, 15. 
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b.  Movement of People  The Schengen Aquis 
During the 1980s, a European debate opened up about the meaning of 
free movement of persons.  Initially, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries created 
a territory without internal borders.  Dubbed the Schengen Area for the Luxembourg 
town where the five nations signed the agreement, by 1997 the intergovernmental border 
regime included 13 EU countries.  It abolished the internal borders of the signatory states 
and created a single external border where a single set of rules governs immigration.56  
Essentially, the Schengen approach  is based on a premise that insiders will create 
policies that outsiders will have to accept.57 
The introduction of Schengen by Poland and Lithuania will have an 
impact in terms of their visa requirements and border controls.  While the requirement of 
Schengen will be no different for Kaliningrad than for any other part of Russia, the 
impact on the population will be greater there than in other parts of Russia, given the 
location of Kaliningrad.  Poland intends to introduce Schengen standards in 2001 and 
Lithuania at the latest upon accession.  This will have implications for transit and travel 
of persons.  Travel, for whatever purpose, to or through EU members requires a visa.  
Visa-free transit (currently available to Kaliningrad and certain categories of Russian 
citizens transiting Lithuania) will no longer be possible.  In addition, Kaliningrad citizens 
will be obliged to travel in possession of a valid passport (as opposed to the internal 
                                                 
56 Incorporating the Schengen Acquis into the European Union Framework; 
available from http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133020.htm. 
57 Pertti Joenniemi, Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe, in The EU 
and Kaliningrad, eds. James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal Trust for 
Education and Research, 2000), 164. 
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identity documents which are currently accepted).58  The EU contends that these border 
regimes will not necessarily impede the movement of people between Kaliningrad and 
the rest of Russia and to and from other EU members.  The acquis provides for the 
issuance of transit visas, short-term visas, and long-term national visas allowing for 
smooth border crossing and the possibility of multiple entries.  
However, Kaliningraders increasingly see the EU as an organization that 
intends to make access more difficult and more expensive than the access they have 
enjoyed until recently.  Currently, only two properly authorized consulates in Kaliningrad 
can provide the needed visas.  Additionally, there is insufficient sensitivity as to whether 
or not Kaliningrad residents can pay for these visas without difficulties.  In a Russian 
region where people can hardly afford to feed themselves, adding substantial costs to 
such basic rights as visiting friends and relatives causes undue hardships.  In a speech 
given at Kaliningrad in February 2001, an economic consultant working in the Oblast 
shared the following story that succinctly demonstrates the problem: 
I am traveling between Moscow and Kaliningrad by train.  Thus, on 
Tuesday I paid $68 to the Belarussian Consulate in Moscow for a transit 
visa allowing me to sleep on a Russian train as it passes through Belarus.  
Last August I paid $30 for the same privilege.  A few months before that 
there was no requirement for a transit visa at all for foreigners in 
possession of a valid Russian visa.59 
 
                                                 
58 Communication from the Commission to the Council. 
59 Stephen Dewar, Russia, Kaliningrad Oblast and the Baltic Sea Region: An 
Appeal for Enhanced Cooperation (speech given during a panel discussion: Cross 
Border Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, Kaliningrad, Russian Federation, 9 
February 2001); received text from speaker. 
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It is reasonable to expect the same phenomenon once the new members 
initiate the EU visa regime.  Further, for Kaliningraders, EU visa policies do not pay 
adequate attention to the substantial burden these costs and difficulties impose on people 
involved in legitimate shuttle trading in small-border traffic areas (traffic within areas 
adjacent to the external border).  Shuttle trading accounts for 10 percent of Kaliningrads 
GDP and the disruption of these socio-economic ties will be devastating for a significant 
portion of the population. 
The EU steadfastly refuses to accept arrangements emanating from Soviet 
and post-Soviet practices where identification documents and special permits (propiska) 
replace passports and visas.  Such arrangements cannot maintain the integrity of the EUs 
external border.60  The Finno-Russian border remains the only relevant comparison to the 
future common border with Kaliningrad.  Finland claims that the EU border regime has 
proven its worth.  It is both flexible and secure.  Additionally, Finland invested 
significant funds to modify its border crossing points, purchase information systems, and 
train customs personnel.  Therefore, it is not surprising that Finland will demand that all 
acceding countries sharing a common border with Russia adopt a border regime on a par 
with her own.61 
                                                 
60 Estonia, a strong candidate for the next round of EU enlargement, has already 
stopped the visa-free small border traffic between Narva and Ivangorod.  Estonia now 
requires passports, but is ready to issue multiple entry visas without a fee for locals.  
However, this practice will undoubtedly cease with full EU membership. 
61 Rene Nyberg, The Baltic as an Interface Between the EU and Russia in The 
EU and Kaliningrad, eds. James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal Trust 
for Education and Research, 2000) 52-53. 
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Freedom of movement for Kaliningraders is not a mere convenience; it is 
a way of life.  The ability to transit from one point to another within the same country 
must be a tenet that the EU embraces.  Should Schengen make travel between Moscow 
and Kaliningrad costly, time consuming and inefficient it is very likely that Moscow 
could interpret these moves as persecutory and insist on accommodations.  Movement of 
people will be a stability issue for the Baltic in the context of an enlarging EU. 
c.  Energy 
Kaliningrad imports around 80 percent of its energy needs from Russia via 
Lithuania that results in very significant hard currency costs.  Lithuania envisages a link 
to the central Europe electricity grid by establishing a connection with Poland and 
disconnecting from the Russian grid.  Together with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland are integrating their energy markets and networks in order to connect them with 
those of the EU.  These countries will participate in the Baltic Ring for electricity, 
which means that Kaliningrad will be an imported energy-dependent enclave within an 
integrated EU energy network.  Although a pipeline from Russia to Kaliningrad via 
Lithuania will ease some of the energy pressures, dependence on imported energy will 
remain a feature for the near future.  
Kaliningrads total dependence on imported energy can lead to regional 
stability problems.  Energy exporters, mainly Lithuania, expect payment for the goods 
they provide; and they expect payment in their own currency.  Should Kaliningrad fail to 
pay the bill and Lithuania literally turns out the lights, Moscows reaction will be 
unpredictable.  It is bad enough that Kaliningraders will have to live and work in the dark 
and cold.  From a security perspective, energy stoppages could blind the air defenses on 
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which Russia depends and put the Baltic Fleet at a further disadvantage.  Should this 
scenario unfold after NATO expansion to the Baltics, there is no telling how Moscow 
will interpret or respond to such an eventuality. 
2.  Economic 
By far the major source of instability is Kaliningrads miserable economy.  This 
exacerbates all the other current and potential sources because the fight against pollution, 
crime, disease, visa regimes, and energy supply all require money.  A disheveled 
economy does not produce enough government income to fund the work projects 
necessary to build the infrastructure, reduce unemployment, train police, pay judges, and 
protect investors that will, in turn, create social stability, disposable income, and a higher 
standard of living.  The economic development of Kaliningrad is of political necessity 
and regional stability, not an economic boon for the Russian Federation. 
Kaliningrad has been slow to recover from poor economic policies of the last ten 
years.  Additionally, the Oblast is not competitive in the region.  With nine countries and 
dozens of major industrialized areas around the Baltic Rim from which to choose, 
corporate and individual investors have plenty of options for expansion and growth.  
Kaliningrad is at the bottom of most lists.  Moscows apparent preference for St. 
Petersburg over Kaliningrad completes the Oblasts economic handicap.  Further, 
Kaliningrad needs huge expenditures of capital, both human and financial, to bring the 
economy to a workable and even moderately attractive level. 
a.  Failed Economic Plans 
When looking at Kaliningrads current dismal situation, it is easy to see 
how the catastrophe played out.  As Moscow tried to pull the fledgling Russian 
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Federation out from beneath the shadow of its Soviet forebears, they implemented many 
ill advised programs that turned out to be either mere gimmicks to lure western money 
into Russian oligarchs coffers or they were politically defeated before implementation.   
Established in 1991, Kaliningrads Free Economic Zone (FEZ) promised 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by lowering barriers to entry.  Many companies 
immediately took advantage, including Kia Motors of Korea, and several German, Polish, 
Lithuanian, and Italian firms.  However, within 4 years most abandoned their projects, 
then-President Yeltsin disbanded the FEZ after a push from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank convinced Moscow that such programs were fiscally 
irresponsible given Russias financial situation.  In 1996, Kaliningrad won approval for a 
different program.  The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is a watered down version of its 
earlier cousin.  However, the SEZ simply offers tax concessions and failed to entice he 
most investors.  Technically still in place, the SEZ has not benefited either Kaliningrad or 
Russia. 
Many economists believe regional economical development plans are the 
preferred method to deal with small, struggling economies.  Often times they take the 
very form of Kaliningrads FEZ and SEZ.  Why, then, was the Kaliningrad version such a 
miserable failure?  The answer is simple:  they put the cart before the horse.  In other 
words, Kaliningrad tried to lure investment before any infrastructure necessary to support 
such capital improvement projects was in place.  Table 3 lists the major reasons for the 




Reason for Failure Impact on Economic Development 
 
Poor Communications Network Poor road, rail and telecommunications increase costs through 
inefficiency 
 
Major Environmental Hazards Increased costs of renovating, building, operating all types of 
facilities 
 
Unstable Legal Foundation Prevented any recourse through the courts for criminal activity; 
prevented clear understanding of permissible vs. prohibited 
business practices 
 
Balance of Payments Imports grew to 500% of exports; requirement for natural 
resources exceeded output and the region as a whole operated at a 
loss  
 
Tax Management Incoherent tax code drove up costs as investors were taxed 
arbitrarily 
 
Political Instability Governor Gorbenko promoted cronyism that stifled competition, 
initiative, and creativity 
 
Macroeconomic Instability Skyrocketing inflation leads to a poor investment climate 
 
No Property Rights Investors prohibited from owning property; had to pay enormous 
rents that were translated to consumer costs 
 
Corrupt Bureaucracies Corruption drives up costs 
 
 
Table 3.  Kaliningrads Economic Program Failures 
 
b.  Competitive Kaliningrad 
Competition is the engine that drives a market economy.  As Table 3 
points out, Kaliningrad was not, and is not, competitive.  Any state or region with such a  
poor business environment cannot expect to attract investment and compete with 
neighboring nations.  The World Economic Fund defines competition for nations as 
the ability of a country to achieve sustained high rates of growth in GDP per 
capita.62  Certain preconditions must exist to achieve that growth.  Essentially Table 3 
lists those preconditions as Kaliningrads failures.  By assuming FDI would bring 
                                                 
62 The C-word Strikes Back, The Economist, 1 June 1996, 76. 
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prosperity, Kaliningrad economic planners applied regional development theory in 
reverse.  Kaliningrad had to first meet those preconditions and then the investment, 
exports, and GDP growth would follow.  They are indicators of competitiveness, not 
tools by which a state becomes competitive.  Economic analysts evaluate each area and 
determine a regions potential competitive ability.  For example: are communication 
networks good or bad?  Are environmental hazards present or absent?  Is the legal 
foundation stable or unstable?  A countrys future prosperity depends on its growth in 
productivity, which government policies can influence.  Nations compete in that they  
Region/State 
 
FDI per Capita (year) 
Hungary $1,667 (1998) 
Lithuania $563 (1999) 
Poland $260 (1998) 
Novgorod $128 (1997) 
Kaliningrad $70 (1999) 
Russia $63 (1998) 
 
Table 4.  Foreign Direct Investment as a Measure of Competitiveness63 
 
choose policies to promote higher living standards through successful economic 
development.  The best measure of success or failure of governmental policies in these 
areas are GDP growth, export growth or FDI.  These factors are consequences of a 
countrys competitiveness and not the causes of it.  Table 4 shows where Kaliningrad fits 
as a viable competitor within the region. The paltry FDI in Kaliningrad tells investors 
what others think of the region.  There is not much money coming in.  Investors ask, 
Why?  The answers range from government corruption to poor road networks.  At that 
point they take their money elsewhere.  
                                                 
63 Joenniemi, Kaliningrad Puzzle, 17. 
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c.  Movement of Goods and Transportation Infrastructure 
At present, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 
1994 governs EU-Russia trade relations.  Upon accession, Poland and Lithuania will 
apply the EU common external tariff in trade between Russia and the enlarged EU.  Once 
Poland and Lithuania join, Kaliningrad will be subject to a 4.1 percent EU tariff.  That is 
a reduction from the 15.8 percent Poland charges and the 4.1 percent levied by Lithuania.  
These lower tariff levels will apply to goods originating in Kaliningrad on the same basis 
as the rest of Russia.  Given its proximity to EU markets this prospect of cheaper access 
represents an important opportunity for Kaliningrad.64  Table 5 summarizes the 
import/export volume between Kaliningrad and its two border nations.  From the data 
provided, it is obvious there will be a significant savings in customs duties, especially on 
exports to Poland. 
At present, goods originating in Kaliningrad, which are destined for 
Russia, and vice versa, transit through Lithuania and Latvia/Belarus.  After enlargement, 
the PCA will provide free transit through Lithuania and/or Latvia, without customs duties 
or any other transit duties (other than charges for transport and administration).  The PCA 
will also benefit trade in goods between Russia and the EU, since it grants Russia MFN 




                                                 
64 Communication from the Commission to the Council. 
65 Ibid. 
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 Kaliningrad exports to: Kaliningrad imports from: 
 $ million Percent of Total $ million Percent of Total 
Poland 101.7 26 20.6 17 
Lithuania 31.2 8 19.4 16 
 
Table 5.  Import/Export Figures for Kaliningrad, Poland, and Lithuania (1997)66 
 
It is the transport infrastructure and not the cost transportation that is 
crippling Kaliningrads economy.  A weak to nonexistent transport infrastructure makes 
the volume of cargo through Kaliningrad so slight that even low costs cannot work to 
businesses advantage.   
Kaliningrads air services are deplorable.  As with many other mini-
Aeroflots, Kaliningrad Air Enterprises (KLN) has serious financial difficulties.  It has 
six passenger aircraft and nothing with which to fly cargo.  Furthermore, there are 
inadequate physical facilities to support warehousing and cargo handling operations at 
the airport.  Because there are no scheduled passenger flights to neighboring countries 
(except 1 per day to Copenhagen) business people cannot easily get in and out of 
Kaliningrad.  The lack of air service is holding back international economic and business 
relationships.  This is a complex and expensive problem to solve; it is having a negative 
impact on Kaliningrad in an era of global relationships that depend on quick access.67 
Surface transport infrastructure is in similarly poor condition.  Kaliningrad 
is included in the Trans-European Network (TEN), a system of road and rail routes that 
link Scandinavia to Russia, the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine.  Routes I and IX have spurs 
                                                 
66 Köll, 450-451. 
67 Stephen Dewar, Kaliningrad: Key Economic Issues, in The EU and 
Kaliningrad, eds. James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal Trust for 
Education and Research, 2000), 80. 
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that pass through Kaliningrad and are designed to create a port to port link along the 
Baltic Seas eastern shoreline from Tallinn to Gdansk.  However, if Kaliningrad does not 
bring their portion up to standard, goods can bypass the Oblast without affecting any 
other region.  Kaliningrad, then, suffers a double disadvantage: it does not have a 
competitive transport infrastructure to service transit traffic between Poland and the 
Baltic States and its transport infrastructure is not essential to the region as a whole.  
Each country is responsible for financing their portions of these TENs and 
highway/railway construction and repair is complicated and expensive.  Moscow has 
given funding priority to their portions of the major arteries passing through the country 
and claim there is nothing available for the Kaliningrad spurs.68  Kaliningrad needs 
money to improve roads and rail.  If they do not make the changes soon, Poland and 
Lithuania can bypass or modify the TEN to go around Kaliningrad via their shared 
border.  Should this happen, it sets up the slippery slope.  Once cut off from trade routes, 
revamping Kaliningrads economy and further developing the Oblast ends. 
With a number of ports on the Baltic Sea in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 
the USSR was able to distribute deliveries and shipments of cargoes.  After the 
disintegration of the USSR, the only viable commercial port was St. Petersburg.  
Kaliningrad, of low importance during Soviet times for commercial goods, lost whatever 
importance it used to have.  Kaliningrad has never handled more than four or five percent 
of total cargo going through the Baltic ports from St Petersburg down to Kaliningrad.  
Taking account of Finnish ports and Gdansk reduces this share even further.  Latvia, for 
example, handles considerably more inbound and outbound Russian cargo than 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 78. 
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Kaliningrad.69  While the military aspect of Kaliningrad during the Soviet period 
contributed to its modest commercial use, inadequate facilities and inattention are to 
blame for Kaliningrads negligible role as a Russian import/export hub in post-Soviet 
times. 
The bulk of Russian investment in transport infrastructure around the 
Baltic rim has gone to St. Petersburg.  With little competitive advantage because of 
transport tariffs, Moscow largely ignored Kaliningrads economic potential.  Instead, St. 
Petersburg is to become Russias major transport hub in the Baltic.  Work has already 
started on a new high-speed railway line, on new ports near the city, and on expanding 
the citys existing seaport.70  Although the EU has funded a port study for Kaliningrad, 
Moscow has provided very little development money for the Oblast and has not publicly 
committed any in the future. 
Another transport component that requires large sums of money is 
Kaliningrads border crossing points.  At present, there are 23 crossing points between 
Kaliningrad, Poland and Lithuania.  The efficient flow of goods between these three areas 
requires improvement both in physical infrastructure and in processing, including 
upgraded information systems.  The EU is quick to point out the successes enjoyed by 
Finland and Lithuanias border crossing improvement programs but conveniently ignores 
the fact that those countries did so at their own, significant, expense.  The current fiscal 
allocations extended from Moscow to Kaliningrad for such projects are non-existent. 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 77. 
70 Alexander Alkhimenko, Secure Development of the St. Petersburg Region: 
An Imperative, Not an Option, in The NEBI Yearbook 1999, ed. Lars Hedegaard (Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag, 1999) 136. 
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C.  OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
1.  Russias Center-Region Relationship 
Russias internal administrative structure has three distinctive types of constituent 
parts with each enjoying a different set of rights vis-à-vis the federal center.71  For 
Kaliningrad this means that it is just one of many similar oblasts.  Constitutionally, there 
is no accounting for its unique geographic and political isolation.  Unlike the republics 
and other larger subdivisions of the Federation, Kaliningrad does not have national 
status; it has no sovereignty clause to act as leverage for the political and economic 
support it so desperately needs.72 
Additionally, the disparity in wealth, productivity, and political influence 
stimulates imbalance across the Federation.  Lacking in Russia today is any public or 
political solidarity to fairly redistribute resources to equalize the different administrative 
units.  Special agreements regulate the division of competence and responsibilities in the 
regions.  Several regions are much more independent than others (e.g. Tatarstan and 
Bahkortostan) and as a rule Russias ethnically based republics have more rights than the 
oblasts.  Elected by popular vote, governors of regions and presidents of republics have a 
strong legitimacy.  The most effective tool for Moscow to control them is the federal 
budget.73  That the main resource needed for saving Kaliningrad is money and that the 
                                                 
71 Igor Leshukov, The Regional-Centre Divide: The Compatibility Conundrum, 
in The EU and Kaliningrad, eds. James Baxendale and Stephen Dewar (London: Federal 
Trust for Education and Research, 2000) 125. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Victor M. Sergeyev, The Nordic Countries and Russia: Prospects for 
Cooperation. in The NEBI Yearbook 1999, ed. Lars Hedegaard (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1999) 211-212. 
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federal center continues to hold the purse strings guarantees Moscows prominent role in 
every facet of Kaliningrads political and economic life. 
Further complicating the center-region relationship is President Putins vision of 
recreating a strong state.  While the effect of Putins seven new federal districts and his 
newly elected and loyal servants in many key districts remains to be seen, it is obvious 
that President Putin is intent on returning a significant amount of power to Moscow at the 
expense of regional governors.  Kaliningrads current Governor, Vladimir Yegorov, is 
widely held as a Putin man who owes his election victory to the President.  Whether or 
not that loyalty works both ways is unknown.  Most likely, Putin will use Yegorov to 
execute Moscows plan; it is unlikely that Yegorov will enjoy the same support for 
innovations he may want to implement. 
This situation has a direct impact on the attitudes and decisions of the 
regional authority.  On the one hand, as a Russian exclave, Kaliningrad 
has many reasons to develop its relations with its neighbors and to 
improve its compatibility with the surrounding political and economic 
environment.  On the other hand, the benefits and importance of its 
dependent relationship with the federal center are much more serious and 
immediate.  The principle guiding the relations of the regional authorities 
with Moscow could be defined primarily as one of feudal loyalty74 
 
2.  Fear of Separatism 
Many Russians see Kaliningrad as the only remaining trophy of an extremely 
costly and tragic war.  For them, there is an emotional attachment to Kaliningrad.  
Additionally, after losing the three Baltic States with the collapse of the USSR, there is 
a further impetus to retain a presence in the southeast part of the Baltic littoral.  
Economic success for Kaliningrad implies integration into western institutions like the 
                                                 
74 Leshukov, 129. 
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EU since Kaliningrad cannot attain the same promise of economic benefit from Russia.  
As Russian logic goes, once tied to those institutions, it will only be a matter of time 
before separatist tendencies manifest themselves in a demand for full sovereignty.  
Indeed, this is not a new notion.  As early as 1991, then-Governor Matochkin proposed 
an autonomous Kaliningrad as a fourth Baltic republic.75  His plan never materialized and 
he was hustled out of office shortly thereafter. 
Those who fear a Kaliningrad separatist movement only have a convincing 
argument if they discuss the possibility in the very distant future.  It will take at least 
three generations and myriad other events to build a Kaliningrad culture and identity 
separate from their Russian cousins.  Kaliningrad is 95 percent Russian.  Today, to be a 
Kaliningrader has very limited utility.  They are Russians first and Kaliningraders 
second.76  Further, the Russian military and its base in Baltiisky are intact.  Their role in 
Russian security is irrefutable and, for the immediate future, will be the main obstacle to 
any separatist movement.  Moscow simply will not allow it.  Conceivably the future 
climate can become conducive to Moscow striking a Sevastopol-like deal with 
Kaliningrad where an independent Kaliningrad can host the base at Baltiisky just as an 
independent Ukraine hosts Russias Sevastopol facility.  This type of arrangement is not 
at all uncommon.  Many nations maintain basing privileges for their military grounded on 
historical ties, diplomatic agreements, or mutually beneficial security arrangements. 
                                                 
75 Joenniemi, Kaliningrad Puzzle, 4. 
76 This statement is derived from interviews with westerners who have lived and 
worked in Kaliningrad between 1996 and 1999. 
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During the Yeltsin years, Moscow concluded special treaties with many regions 
and republics in return for political support.  Yeltsin sent a message to the fledgling 
regions:  take as much sovereignty as you can77 Some republics went even further 
and declared outright independence seeking to split from Russia altogether.  The Chechen 
wars and the Tatarstan separatist movement ring prominently in the collective memories 
of Moscows politicians. 
Although bilateral agreements between the federal center and the regions seem to 
have dissipated, Moscows fear of renewed separatists movements reigns supreme.  It is 
this fear that Kaliningrad reformers must heed.  The concern about not offending 
Moscow seems pervasive among regional diplomats.  Individual countries and the EU 
take special care to please Moscow and underplay relations with the regions in order 
not to get caught in rivalry between Moscow and the regions.78  
During a 1999 Russian-EU summit in Helsinki, then-Foreign Minister Putin 
presented Russias engagement strategy for working with the EU.  He described 
Kaliningrad as a pilot region.  On the surface, this may indicate a thawing of Russian 
separatist fears.  A pilot project, however, should include activities that are new for 
Russia and that Moscow cannot implement throughout the whole country.  In other 
words, the term pilot program should denote new endeavors to be tested on 
Kaliningrads soil.79 
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3.  Two Faces of the European Union 
Moscow has several options to deal with Kaliningrads development.  It can 
address issues unilaterally, bilaterally with individual Baltic nations, engage the wider 
European Union, or adopt some combination of these three policies.  All indications are 
that Russia intends to court the EU as the primary lender of assistance, both technical and 
financial.  The EU addresses the crucial aspect of security through economic 
development and political evolution.  The EU umbrella, with its myriad programs and 
funding sources underneath, can help Kaliningrad deal with its democratic consolidation, 
infrastructure, and economy.  It is against this backdrop that many Kaliningrad-watchers 
propose Russia and the Western democracies adopt joint efforts to resolve the Oblasts 
many problems and reduce the prospects that at some point they become sources of 
serious friction. 
However, the EU is not interested in assuming this burden.  According to 
Brussels, Kaliningrad is Moscows problem to solve.  EU cooperation will only be within 
the existing framework of programs and regulations.  There will be no special agreement 
or deal between the EU and Kaliningrad.  While the EU is prepared to provide assistance 
and cooperation, it maintains that the responsibility for finding solutions to Kaliningrads 
problems lies solely and entirely with Russia and Kaliningrad.80  This means that 
Kaliningrads approach to finding a way of integrating with the neighboring states in the 
European economic space will have to be the same as that used by other countries all 
over the world  developing mutually beneficial trade, investment and business relations. 
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On one hand, the EU pronounces the dangers inherent in an unstable and destitute 
Kaliningrad; on the other, it says it will not be the resource provider for correcting those 
problems.  The EUs Action Plan for the Northern Dimension lists several functional 
areas in northern Europe and northwest Russia that need assistance: energy, environment, 
public health etc.  Included in that list is Kaliningrad.  The EU explicitly acknowledges 
Kaliningrads problems yet has provided only 4-5 million euro per year for mostly 
technical assistance (consulting, studies, and border crossing improvements).81  
A simple explanation for the EUs stance is that it would be illegal for the Union 
to fund Kaliningrads recovery.  Neither Russia nor Kaliningrad is a candidate for EU 
membership.  Nothing in the EUs morass of treaties permits spending the vast sum of 
money necessary to fix an entity outside its current or potential border.  Forcing Moscow 
to address the Kaliningrad problem is a likely intention of the EU policy.  Assuming 
Moscow appreciates Kaliningrads dilemma (significant documentation indicates it at 
least understands the impact of EU enlargement on Kaliningrad) the EU may be forcing 
Moscows hand to begin using state funds for the Oblasts recovery instead of waiting for 
someone else to pay the bill.  It could also be that the EU is maintaining its distance from 
Kaliningrad to avoid becoming embroiled in the center-region struggle.  Finally, it could 
be that Brussels hopes to stimulate further bilateral arrangements between Russia and its 
neighbors.  Kaliningrad enjoys a healthy bilateral relationship with several Baltic nations; 
as Table 6 points out, many already provide funding.  However, this money and the 
                                                 
81 Because they are EU candidates, in 2000 Poland and Lithuania received 1.1 
billion and 180 million euro respectively.  Based on population, land size and GDP, if 
Kaliningrad was a candidate its share would increase ten times! 
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Country  000s Sectors/Projects 
European Commission 30,000 Institution building, enterprise restructuring, human 
resources development 
 
Denmark 10,000 Energy, environment, human resources development 
 
Sweden 4,000 Business development, administrative reform, land 
reform, disease prevention 
 
Germany 1,000 Education, agriculture, economic development 
 
Finland >1,000 HIV prevention, environment 
 
Lithuania >1,000 HIV prevention, civil society development, education 
 
Poland >1,000 Cross border cooperation 
 
Norway >1,000 Energy savings 
 
United States >1,000 Civil society development 
 
 
Table 6.  Technical Assistance in Kaliningrad 1991-199982 
 
 products they fund are similar to EU technical assistance rather than substantive 
infrastructure and economic redevelopment. 
Since Moscow cannot fund and the EU will not fund Kaliningrads capital 
improvement projects, courting the individual nations around the Baltic Rim is the most 
promising solution.  Every Baltic nation is either a current or an aspiring EU member 
(Norway is an exception  it is not in the EU and its Baltic connection is more Nordic 
than Baltic).  They all support the Northern Dimension and participate in regional 
coordination bodies like the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC).  Therefore, they each have an understanding for and 
appreciation of Kaliningrads predicament and the impact inattention can have on their 
                                                 
82 Communication from the Commission to the Council. 
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individual states.  During a February 2001 conference at Kaliningrad State University, 
one speaker outlined a plan for a Kaliningrad development fund.83  If enacted, the fund 
will accept monies from interested states and use them to rebuild Kaliningrads 
infrastructure.  The main point of the fund will be to make all disbursements conditional:  
on legislative reforms, on matching funds, on total transparency and accountability, etc.  
While this idea may seem impossible, it is one of the few concrete suggestions that 
extend beyond rhetoric and outlines action.  Kaliningrad needs money, if Brussels and 
Moscow will not provide it then perhaps the individuals who stand to lose the most will. 
                                                 
83 Dewar, Appeal for Enhanced Cooperation. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, ancient trading links around the Baltic Sea 
reopened.  The Eastern Baltic once again had an opportunity to join their prosperous 
western neighbors.  Kaliningrad, a geographical and political anomaly, has been unable 
to resume the role its pre-communist heritage established.  Kaliningrad, forever a part of 
the Russia Federation, could not and cannot return to its place in the socio-economic 
sphere around the Baltic Rim.  It remains a destitute, troubled island in a sea of 
recovering states. 
Fortunately, both Kaliningrads neighbors and Moscow have finally noticed its 
plight.  In a first for any Federation subject, Kaliningrad actively participates in regional 
coordination and cooperation bodies like the CBSS and the BEAC.  On Kaliningrads 
behalf, Moscow arranged bilateral technical assistance to study ways of improving the 
Oblasts situation and designated Kaliningrad a pilot region for future cooperation with 
the EU.  While technical assistance programs mostly pay for studies and opinions and the 
pilot program has yet to engage in any new, innovative program, Kaliningrad is at least 
part of the Russia plus Europe equation.  Unlike post-WWII and post-USSR, when 
Kaliningrad was invisible to decision makers, in the 21st century Kaliningrad will have a 
role to play and its unique challenges will become projects for all Baltic nations. 
Kaliningrads role in the hard security posture of Northern Europe and the Baltic 
is a political, not military, one.  All the rhetoric from Moscow about NATO expansion 
vis-à-vis Kaliningrad is saber rattling.  Kaliningrad is indefensible gives Russian 
policymakers plenty of reasons to oppose NATO expansion, especially to Lithuania.  If 
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NATO were so inclined, it could overrun Kaliningrad regardless of Baltic affiliation with 
the Alliance.  Likewise, Russia could (and its Soviet predecessors did!) sweep through 
the Baltic States to the sea with or without NATO presence.  Tactical nuclear missiles in 
the Oblast are strategically insignificant.  Operationally and tactically, they could cause 
planners to revise any schemes of military operations in the region.  For example, NATO 
will reevaluate operational plans for Polands defense under Article V of the Washington 
Treaty with a view toward Russian nuclear weapons in neighboring Kaliningrad.  
Kaliningrad is a political pawn in Russias foreign policy.  Moscow is using NATO 
expansion to justify Kaliningrads military role and as the substantive argument for 
inclusion in the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  Moscows 
maintains a hard line, fundamental belief that European security is the Europeans (of 
which Russians are part) responsibility.  It is a poorly veiled attempt at reducing the U.S. 
influence in Europe through NATO.   
To handle Kaliningrads soft security threats, the Baltic region has been 
conducting joint, multi-disciplinary law enforcement operations.  From the start, Russia 
has been one of the most active members of the Task Force.  Kaliningrad participated in a 
series of operations against stolen vehicles (The Kaliningrad project, 1998), drugs 
(Channel, 1999) and illegal migration (Baltic Guard 1997-98 and VIVAN, 1999).  These 
joint operations contribute to confidence building and improvement of soft security in the 
Baltic Sea area.  While these operations have improved outside perceptions, they have 
not curbed the crime rate or enticed investors to the region.  Joint environmental studies 
plainly point to the sources of and remedies for the major pollution problem emanating 
from Kaliningrad.  To date, no appreciable cleanup has begun.  Self-destructive behavior 
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and inadequate intervention or education continue to make public health the number one 
soft security threat from Kaliningrad.  Moscow lags behind its European neighbors in 
funding programs for improving public health.  Once again, individual states provide 
expertise, opinions, and courses of action.  None of them has (or even should) funded the 
Oblasts health system. 
Kaliningrads problems are well known.  Its negative impact on the Baltic littoral 
are largely undisputed, even by Moscow.  Not another day is necessary to determine 
what is to be done.  The solution to Kaliningrads problems is simple:  money.  
Kaliningrad must develop new industries that provide the goods and services people want 
to buy on Russian and international markets.  It is this process that creates jobs, generates 
tax revenues and pushes forward the process of creating prosperity and enabling 
economic development.  To achieve this, the primary and overwhelming need is to attract 
investment, Russian and foreign.  Investment means more than just money.  It is 
technologies, equipment, skills, expertise, international business networks, and all the 
other ingredients necessary to sustain an internationally competitive economy.  With the 
overall Russian economy flailing, Moscow is incapable of providing these resources.  
The solution requires external involvement. 
However, the most resource rich body to assist Kaliningrad, the EU, directed that 
responsibility for Kaliningrad lies with Russia and the region itself.  Although the EU and 
its future members have an interest in helping to ensure that the changes required by 
expansion are made smoothly and in fostering cooperation with Kaliningrad on a number 
of regional issues, it continues to provide only technical assistance.  Currently, EU 
involvement is one of indifference.  By throwing money at narrowly focused projects 
 66
instead of regional or strategic ones, the EU is inadvertently isolating Kaliningrad.  
Tempered programs that lack enthusiasm, political support, or supervision destine the 
Oblast for further stagnation.  An isolated Kaliningrad will become a thorn in the side of 
European unity and community.  The proliferation of the socio-economic soft security 
threats mentioned above will prevent Kaliningrads neighbors from meeting the same 
competitive criteria Kaliningrad itself is lacking.  If that becomes the case, the region 
(Lithuania in particular) will have to take measures to lessen the impact Kaliningrad is 
having on their economic posture.  This type of economic warfare will be a direct result 
of an indifference or isolationist policy, intentional or not. 
Integration is the key.  The EU must recognize that Kaliningrad is, de facto, a 
member of the European family.  It must be included as an equal partner in a strategy 
aimed at a regional solutions vice one that addresses states individually.  With 
Kaliningrad treated as a player in the development of the Baltic, the EU can proactively 
reduce certain opportunity costs that will surely result if the west ignores Kaliningrad.  
The EU must take the initiative.  Although it may appear that the EU is giving Russia a 
free ride by absorbing some of the costs associated with making Kaliningrad 
competitive, a competitive Kaliningrad will better serve not only Russia but the EU 
partners as well.  For if they leave Kaliningrad to smother in its own quagmire, then the 
constant annoyance to its neighbors in the form of soft security threats will prevent 
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